ABSTRACT
The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engaged with each other and their five major neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, namely China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, to develop the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a comprehensive free trade agreement streamlining all previous agreements among the participating countries. This article applied the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) method in assessing the RCEP and the key role played by the ASEAN in the negotiation process through middle-power diplomacy. The RCEP's strengths in economic integration and weaknesses in certain policy areas encapsulate ASEAN centrality and its strategy of hedging on China, the sole great power in the agreement. The opportunities and threats to the RCEP posed by the increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the US amid the COVID-19 pandemic, meanwhile, demonstrate the complex regional and global geopolitical situation that ASEAN should navigate to ensure the success of the RCEP and maintain centrality in the process. © 2023, Yijun Institute of International Law. All rights reserved.
ABSTRACT
South Korea's reluctant response to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy so far has failed to send a clear-cut signal to regional countries. Despite upholding multilateralism as the cornerstone of its middle power diplomacy, South Korea has not worked in line with Indo-Pacific second-size powers given Seoul's relatively vague response to the Indo-Pacific structure. With foreign policy shifts from Trump to Biden, South Korea may be well-positioned to communicate its policies with a more nuanced response to the Indo-Pacific. To leverage Seoul's middle power standing and its commitment to multilateralism, the Moon Jae-in administration can be expected to reflect on clearer definitions of what 'Indo-Pacific' means and come up with a more comprehensive understanding of multilateral cooperation in the region so as not to mistake 'Indo-Pacific' for its security connotation. As for South Korea, pursuing a three-headed strategy, for example, continuing to position itself in the Indo-Pacific region as a balancer, enhancing ties with like-minded middle powers, and deepening the South Korea-ASEAN relationship, could accommodate Seoul's interests and concerns amid the U.S.–China strategic competition and the COVID-19 pandemic. © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
ABSTRACT
The Cold War theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which described the reciprocal damage resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, can be expanded in the 21st century to include more dimensions including climate and the economy. The economic dimension of MAD (dubbed as EMAD) is a situation where one country is incapable of disrupting trade with a target country without also causing itself significant economic d[amage. This can occur given the presence of a specific economic advantage on which the coercing power relies. How can the presence of EMAD help afford middle powers more leeway in their alignment decisions within this strategic dilemma? What economic advantages create a stronger situation of EMAD? In line with these inquiries, this article investigates three cases, each with differing degrees of economic MAD: the 2016 Korea-China dispute over THAAD deployment;the 2020 Australia-China dispute over Covid-19;and the 2022 case of Korea's participation in IPEF. After all, middle powers need to develop a 'collective security-type arrangement' where China's wielding of economic muscle against any middle power state is considered an aggression against all other middle powers, which act together or collectively assist the target state to make the most of EMAD vis-a-vis China. For this, it is reasonable and realistic to promote the democratic liberal international order (LIO) by aligning with U.S.-led minilateral and multilateral initiatives or mechanisms. Yet, it is also important to identify areas and ways to engage with China rather than alienating or excluding it on the international stage.
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has left international cooperation and liberalistic values in crisis. As liberalism's downfall is widely discussed, international collaborations like the European Union are criticised for their inability to operate adequately during the pandemic. The four examples in this paper are middle power countries (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore) in terms of economic scale and influence. The purpose of this study was to uncover possibilities for and limitations of these middle powers within international cooperative efforts during and after the pandemic. The unknown factor is the path the post-pandemic world will follow. Will nations focus on independent survival? Or will international cooperation shape the new world? Globalisation already seems to have progressed too far for the national egoism of the great powers to prevail. Even if face-to-face is replaced by virtual and offline meetings move online, the social nature of humans remains unchanged, and international cooperation remains valid. The four middle power countries in Asia, which are included among the most economically successful countries, are important to international society based on their relatively excellent quarantine performance. What is important in the diplomacy of middle power countries is not traditional security and hard power but the soft power of international law, human rights, health security, and international cooperation.